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Abstract 
 
Working Capital Management (WCM) matters. We obtain strong evidence of a negative 
relationship between Cash Conversion Cycle, a measure of WCM, and Operating Performance, 
measured by three different versions of ROA, indicating as the best way to manage the Working 
Capital, the reduction of the Cash Conversion Cycle. When we analysed the possible impact of 
Private Equity ownership on the WCM of target companies, we don’t find a (statistical) significant 
impact. Notwithstanding, we find weak evidence of Private Equity improvements on Days Sales 
Outstanding but not on Days Inventories Outstanding and Days Inventories Outstanding. 
Additionally, we obtain strong evidence that Private Equity firms chose companies that 
underperform others, if the performance is measured in terms of Gross Margin to total assets ratio, 
in the period before the acquisition improving their performance, consistent with value-added 
hypothesis. Although, Working Capital Management remains as a potential way to generate 
operating gains. Our sample is composed by 29 PE-backed firms in the period between 2007 and 
2012 and 29 similar non PE-backed firms. 
 
Key-words: Private Equity; operating performance; Working Capital 
 
JEL-Codes: G31; G32; G34 
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Resumo 
 
A gestão do fundo de maneio tem impacto na performance das empresas. Nós obtivemos forte 
evidência da existência de uma relação negativa entre o Ciclo de Conversão de caixa, usado como 
medida da gestão do fundo de maneio, e a performance operacional das empresas, indicando 
assim a redução desse ciclo como a melhor forma de gerir o fundo de maneio. A fim de verificar 
a influência do domínio societário dos fundos de Capital de Risco na gestão do fundo de maneio 
das empresas detidas, nós empreendemos duas diferentes análises: uma recaiu sobre todo o 
período em que as empresas adquiridas pelos fundos de Capital de Risco foram detidas por esses 
fundos e a outra recaiu sobre o período composto por 2 ou 3 anos antes e 2 ou 3 anos depois da 
aquisição. Não encontrámos evidência significativa de vantagem competitiva das empresas 
detidas por fundos de capital de risco na gestão do fundo de maneio nem evidência de qualquer 
impacto positiva nessa gestão. No entanto, analisámos o impacto da detenção por fundos de 
Capital de Risco em cada componente do Ciclo de Conversão de Caixa e obtivemos alguma 
evidência de impacto positivo na gestão da conta clientes (redução nos dias que demoram a cobrar 
dívidas de clientes). Adicionalmente, também encontrámos forte evidência de aumento da 
performance operacional após entrada dos fundos de Capital de Risco nas empresas quando 
medida pelo rácio Margem Bruta/Ativo Total, quesito onde as empresas adquiridas tinham pior 
desempenho anterior à aquisição, consistente com a hipótese de criação de valor. A nossa amostra 
é composta por 29 empresas detidas por fundos de capital de risco no período entre 2007 e 2012 
e outras 29 empresas idênticas, mas não detidas por fundos de capital de risco. 
 
Palavras-chave: Capital de risco; Performance Operacional; Fundo de Maneio 
 
JEL-Codes: G31; G32; G34 
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1. Introduction 
The most recent report about Private Equity (“PE”) done by PricewaterhouseCoopers1 
(“PwC”) Germany shows a growth trend in the number and value of PE deals in Europe. 
In 2015, more than 2000 deals were made, representing almost 200 billion euros invested. 
PE investments are seen as a real alternative to the volatile equity markets. The same 
report mentions the rise of importance of operational improvements to PE investors, for 
instance 75% of them reveals that operational improvement is the factor with more 
influence in the returns, this increase in importance occurred after financial crisis, where 
credit availability decreased. On the other hand, the most usual explanation for returns, 
the financial leverage, is reported only by 6% of investors behind also of the multiple 
arbitrage. 
However, the debate about the effects of PE ownership on portfolio companies is far from 
over. While positive impact of tax shields resulted by high leverage is consensual, 
operational performance’s impact is not. This fact is not incompatible with the importance 
reported of operational gains, but it queries about PE skills to make those improvements. 
During eighties the literature show strong evidence of positive operating gains, although 
nineties and more recently studies don’t.  
Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990) and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) studies show strong 
evidence of value creation on Leverage Buyouts (“LBO”) through operating performance 
improvements. Although Guo et al. (2011) and Leslie and Oyer (2008) report inconsistent 
operating gains. 
The capacity to make operational improvements could also depend among other factors 
on the maturity of Private Equity house (Acharya et al., 2010), the existence of 
experienced operating partners (Matthews et al., 2009) or the specialization of funds 
(Scellato and Ugheto, 2013). 
The growing importance of operational improvements on PE portfolio companies and 
doubts on PE ability to do that makes our study very pertinent as we look to one of the 
companies’ areas of potential improvements, Working Capital Management (“WCM”). 
                                                          
1 Roberts, S. a. N., E. (2016). Private Equity Trend Report 2016, PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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In this context, a report done by The Boston Consulting Group2 (“BCG”) in 2012 
indicates four main areas where PE companies can create operational value “financial 
structure, bottom line, top line – core business and top line – expansion”. One of the most 
usual initiative used to improve operational creation value is the working capital 
optimization, indeed it was referred by 64% of PE firms interviewed in this report. 
Moreover, the PwC report refers that WCM is one of the operational areas to improve 
and is referred as an important value-creation driver, but overlooked compared with 
“strategic sourcing and placement” and “commercial optimisation”. Simultaneously, 
44% of PE managers interviewed argued that WCM is the highest driver to create value.  
Guo et al. (2011) also mentioned the use of a more efficient Working Capital as a driver 
of value creation. 
In fact, a report about WCM done by EY3 note a higher importance given to WCM 
compared with previous periods, probably caused by the rising of the cost of capital and 
external financing constraints. 
The same report mentions an excess of $1.3 trillion invested in Working Capital (“WC”) 
in the leading 2000 US and European companies in 2014, an amount which represents 
7% of aggregate sales.  
Moreover, in 2011 Inventories and Accounts Receivables represented 24% of total sales 
of US 1,000 leading companies and more than 18% of book-value of their assets. Those 
numbers illustrate the relevance of a WC’s good management, excess cash invested in 
WC could be used to financing acquisitions and valuable projects.  (Aktas et al., 2015) 
Indeed, there is margin to improve WCM (Ek and Guerin, 2011) and more relevant the 
literature proves that WCM matters. Studies done by Baños-Caballero et al. (2014), 
Baños-Caballero et al. (2012), Deloof (2003) and Aktas et al. (2015) show significant 
evidence of WCM impact on firms’ performance: stock and operational. 
                                                          
2 Brigl, M. et al. (2012). The 2012 Private-Equity Report. Private Equity - Engaging for Growth, The 
Boston Consulting Group. 
3 EY(2015). All tied up: Working Capital Management report, EY Transaction Advisory Services. 
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Despite of the existence of doubts regarding PE ownership ability to make operational 
improvements, we judge pertinent analyse the relationship between WCM and PE 
ownership, being WCM a potential way to improve operating performance. 
Therefore, proved the impact of WCM on Operational Performance, we tested the ability 
of PE-backed firms to manage WC, i.e., if PE-backed firms manage WC better than non 
PE-backed firms. 
We used a sample of 29 PE portfolio companies in Portugal selected in the MergerMarket 
database together with 29 non PE-backed similar firms from SABI database and we didn’t 
find significant evidence of competitive advantage on WCM of PE-backed firms. Then 
using a difference-in-difference model, we also didn’t find that the improvements were 
caused by the PE acquisition of the firm, however when we tested PE acquisition impact 
in each component of Cash Conversion Cycle, we found evidence of a reduction on Days 
Sales Outstanding. 
This dissertation is organized as follows: in Section 2 the literature review is presented. 
The methodology is explained in Section 3. The results are shown in Section 4 while 
Section 5 conclude. 
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2. Literature Review 
Private Equity investments became recurrent/popular in 1980s due to creation value 
evidence and their “exceptional” returns. (Cuny and Tahnor, 2007)   
Although financial crisis had negative effects on PE industry, there is evidence of value 
created by PE investments on PE portfolio companies (Kaplan, 1989); (Smith, 1990) 
(Davis et al., 2008). 
For instance, Renneboog et al. (2007) refer a premium of 40% to shareholders of the pre-
acquisition period in public to private transactions (“PTPs”), a high premium which could 
indicate a large scope to value creation after the acquisition. 
Illustrating, PE skills to create value are compared with 2 alternative scenarios on Cuny 
and Tahnor (2007): hiring an external consultant or replacing current management. They 
conclude that PE buyout is the most successful way to create value. 
Obviously, the impact on value creation will depend on the type of transaction: for 
instance, can differ from Management Buyout1 (“MBO”) to Management Buy-in 
2(“MBI”) or to Institutional Buyout 3(“IBO”) (Renneboog et al., 2007). 
 
2.1. How can PE create value? 
Despite of the evidence of value creation ability of PE investments, sources of value 
creation are not clear. While leverage advantages are almost consensual, operating gains 
are not (Cuny and Tahnor, 2007).  
Concerning this, Renneboog et al. (2007) study potential sources of value creation on PE 
investments. They conclude that PE shareholders create value through undervaluation, 
tax shield and incentives realignment. While, bondholder protection, ownership 
concentration, high FCF available, high stock market transaction costs and high takeover 
pressure had not significant impact on. PE transactions are backed by high leverage and 
consequently, interests’ tax deductions increase. Obviously, the extension of tax shields 
will depend on tax system. Undervaluation is more observable in case of PTP transactions 
                                                          
1 MBO happens when incumbent management acquires the firm with PE house support. 
2 MBI happens when outsider managers acquire the firm with PE house support. 
3 IBO happens when an incumbent institutional investor acquires the firm with PE house support. 
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where there is a share price, the higher price is undervalued the higher will be the 
possibility to increase value. Agency costs pre-transaction also have a positive 
relationship with potential value gains, mainly through incentives realignment, if pre PE-
entry managers have a stake in ownership the margin to create value will be lower. Thus, 
this last source doesn’t close the possibility to operational gains. Moreover, Scellato and 
Ugheto (2013) report reduction on agency costs and efficiency gains as sources of 
operational gains on PE European buyouts. 
Also PE investments effects on growth (Engel, 2002), on patents production (Lerner et 
al., 2013), on productivity (Croce et al., 2013), on long-run market returns (Brav and 
Gompers, 1997) and on the probability to go public (Wright and Robbie, 1998) are 
reported. 
Although leverage benefits are consensual and transversal, operating gains are not. Tax 
benefits as well as disciplinary effects of leverage are reported (Guo et al., 2011). Leslie 
and Oyer (2008) reveal weak evidence of operating gains likewise Scellato and Ugheto 
(2013) show a decrease on Profitability. Indeed, they note a decrease on operating 
profitability 3 years after the deal. 
Even thought Guo et al. (2011) find evidence of small operating gains, they attest the 
importance of operational performance, reporting that it explain 20% of returns. 
In fact, abnormal returns could be linked with sales and operating margin improvements 
post-acquisition period and out-performers deals linked with internal value-creation 
programs (Acharya et al., 2010). 
With the financial crisis there was less credit available, thus PE firms have focused on 
operating improvements (Matthews et al., 2009). 
Guo et al. (2011) argue for value creation on buyouts through a more efficient use of 
productive assets including Working Capital. 
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2.2. Working Capital Management as a tool to improve operational 
performance 
As we previously have mentioned, there is a large amount of cash invested in WC, too 
large to be neglected, even more if financial markets are not perfect (Baños-Caballero et 
al., 2014). 
In fact, there are practical implications of credit policy, suppliers’ payments policy and 
inventories’ management. For instance, a large inventory and a friendly credit policy may 
increase sales: building up a strong relationship with customers, hedging prices volatility 
and avoiding stock ruptures; while delaying suppliers’ payments may decrease pre-
payment discounts (Deloof, 2003). Otherwise, large inventories may increase the risk of 
stock’s value losses, aggressive credit policy may increase the risk of customers’ 
payments failures and quickly suppliers’ payments may increase the risk of less quality 
on suppliers’ products.  
The best way to manage WC components may not be consensual, but there is evidence 
that WC decisions affect firm performance. 
As WC has impact on operational performance, WCM also has impact on stock 
performance and firm risk (Aktas et al., 2015). Notwithstanding, we focus exclusively in 
operational performance. 
Deloof (2003) use Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) as measure of WCM and he finds 
evidence of a negative and linear relation between WCM and operational performance, 
i.e. as the “time lag between the expenditure per the purchases of raw materials and the 
collection of sales of finished goods” increases, operational performance decreases. In 
addition to an aggregate analysis, he analysed the impact of each component of WC in 
operational performance and a negative relation between days inventory outstanding 
(DIO) and days sales outstanding (DSO) with operational performance was found. 
However, the same relation was found in respect to days payable outstanding (DPO).  
Instead controlling each WC’s component individually, it is better controlling CCC, 
because each component may influence others (Baños-Caballero et al., 2012) 
Moreover, Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) explain that a more aggressive WC policy (low 
WC) may result in higher returns and higher risk and a less aggressive WC policy (high 
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WC) may result in lower returns and lower risk. Thus, the existence of a trade-off between 
risk and return may indicate the possibility of a non-linear relation and consequently the 
existence of an optimal value. In this respect, Baños-Caballero, García-Teruel et al. 
(2012) and Aktas et al. (2015) check a potential non-linear relation between WCM and 
firm performance and they conclude that may exist an optimal value of WC. Firms with 
a very low WC level may improve operational performance, increasing that level and 
firms with a high WC level may improve operational performance reducing that.  
Existing an optimal level of WC, the convergence to this level will improve operational 
performance and this level can be influenced by financial constraints, firms more 
financial constrained should have less cash invested on WC  (Baños-Caballero et al., 
2014) 
Nevertheless, a linear relationship is the most consistent and verified, for that reason we 
adopted it in our study. 
 
2.3. Discussed and opened questions  
PE industry on Portugal is not highly developed, it will be useful reveal interesting 
insights about PE effects in Portuguese companies: Do Portuguese PE-backed firms 
outperform Portuguese non PE-backed firms? Will WCM be an explanation? 
Under potential over or underperformance hypothesis of PE-backed firms, it is necessary 
to check if these differences are created by PE-entry or if these differences are inherent 
to PE-backed firms. Like Meles et al. (2014) we test “ex-ante screening role hypothesis” 
and “value-added hypothesis”, analysing (1) the period composed by all PE-ownership 
years and (2) periods composed by pre and post-acquisition years. 
Obviously, without financial data limitations, a more extensive study would have been 
done. For example, PE firm maturity may have an impact on the operational 
improvements as more experience would mean a higher ability to manage companies 
(Acharya et al., 2010); PE specialists may perform better (Scellato and Ugheto, 2013); 
PE bank-based investors may overperform other types. (Hellman et al., 2008); perhaps 
WCM importance should be higher for financial constrained companies (Baños-
Caballero et al., 2014).  
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3. Sample & Methods 
3.1. Sample 
3.1.1. Sample Selection 
Our sample of Portuguese PE portfolio companies was collected from MergerMarket, for 
the period between 2007 and 2014.  
From the initial 94 companies, financial companies and holding companies were excluded 
as well as companies without financial data for at least two years before and two years 
after the acquisition by a PE firm. Financial information was collected from SABI 
database. Finally, were excluded companies in which PE firms didn’t have a majority 
stake. Those restrictions reduced our sample to 29 PE-backed firms. 
In order to create a comparable group we select a control group of 29 similar non PE-
backed firms following Meles et al. (2014) matched-pair methodology: a basic 
comparable firm approach where similar companies have the same two-digit CAE, their 
sales are between 75% and 125% of PE-backed firm sales and have the closest 
EBITDA/Sales ratio, relative to the year before the acquisition. 
 
3.1.2. Variables selection 
As proxy for WCM we use CCC following Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) and Deloof 
(2003). 
In regard to operational performance, we use three different measures of operational 
performance: Gross Margin to Total Assets ratio (“Gross Margin/TA”), EBITDA to Total 
Assets ratio (“EBITDA/TA”) and EBIT to Total Assets ratio (“EBIT/TA”). 
Leverage, measured as Total Debt to Total Assets ratio, Fixed Assets growth, measured 
by the relative variation on Fixed assets relative to previous period, and size, measured 
by the logarithm of sales, were use as control variables. 
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3.1.3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
As shown in Figure 1, half of the companies in our sample are from Lisbon Metropolitan 
area and our companies are almost evenly divided between the industry and services 
sector. Nearly 80% of the PE firms are Portuguese, indicating a possible home bias.  
 
 
Additionally, according to Figure 2, that most of the companies were acquired in 2008. 
 
 
To control for possible outliers we winsorized the variable as in Acharya et al. (2010).  
As we can see in Table 1, during the years of PE-ownership, PE-backed firms have in 
average a lower level of Cash Conversion Cycle, while the operational performance was 
better than the performance of non PE-backed firms. 
Figure 1 – PE-backed firms distributed per Portugal-7 region and per sector 
 
Graph 2 – PE-entries per yearGraph 3 – PE-backed firms distributed per Portugal-7 region and per sector 
 
Graph 4 – PE-entries per yearGraph 5 – PE-backed firms distributed per Portugal-7 region and per sector 
 
Graph 6 – PE-entries per yearGraph 7 – PE-backed firms distributed per Portugal-7 region and per sector 
Figure 2 – PE-entries per year 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of PE-backed firms during PE ownership period, comparing with similar non PE-
backed firms. Data is winsorized by 0.05 and 0.95. 
PE-backed 
2008-2014 
CCC 
(days) 
Gross margin/TA 
(%) 
EBITDA/TA 
(%) 
EBIT/TA 
(%) 
Mean 107 52 5 1 
Median 80 49 5 2 
Max 427 159 27 18 
Min -12 12 -9 -16 
Std. Dev 104 24 9 8 
     
Non PE-Backed 
2008-2014 CCC (days) 
Gross margin/TA 
(%) 
EBITDA/TA 
(%) 
EBIT/TA 
(%) 
Mean 125 8 10 4 
Median 95 42 9 4 
Max 427 247 27 18 
Min -13 12 -9 -16 
Std. Dev 105 78 9 8 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, lower CCC level on PE-backed firms is not always clear, in 
fact there is a convergence in the last three years. Regarding operational performance, it 
depends of the measure used, however a decrease within the years is observed as well an 
apparent non PE-backed over performance over the years. This over performance of non 
PE-backed firms is observed more clearly when measured by EBITDA/TA ratio. 
Figure 3 – Evolution of mean and median of CCC, EBITDA/TA, Gross margin/TA and EBIT/TA on PE and non PE 
samples between 2008 and 2014 
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In general terms, we could say that PE-backed firms underperform non PE-backed firms.  
Results are consistent with a possible competitive advantage of PE-backed firms in terms 
of WCM, but this not necessarily mean that is due to the PE acquisition impact. In order 
to analyse that possibility, we should check changes occurred in the company after the 
PE acquisition. (see table 2) 
Looking for the average value, the results suggest a decrease in CCC, while the results 
regarding operating performance measures are undefined. There is only an improvement 
in Gross Margin consistent with positive PE impact on sales and sales margin. 
Table 2 –Variation on CCC, Gross margin/TA, EBITDA/TA and EBIT/TA. Note: Data is winsorized by 0.05 and 0.95. 
PE backed CCC (days) 
Gross margin/TA 
(%) 
EBITDA/TA 
(%) 
EBIT/TA 
(%) 
Mean     
3 to 2-before 8.51 0 -1 -2 
2 to 1-before 5.88 3 -3 -1 
1-before to 1-after -22.20 20 -8 -7 
1 to 2-after -7.80 2 1 0 
2 to 3-after 1.93 8 -3 -3 
Median     
3 to 2-before 7.29 0 -1 -3 
2 to 1-before -13.30 3 -5 -2 
1-before to 1-after 4.67 37 -9 -3 
1 to 2-after -21.47 -5 3 1 
2 to 3-after -1.97 3 -4 -4 
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3.2. Methodological Considerations 
Having in my mind that the main objective of this dissertation is to test whether PE 
ownership has any impact in the WCM, two models were regressed. The first, test whether 
PE-backed firms have competitive advantages on WCM comparing to non PE-backed 
firms. The second, test if the acquisition by a PE firm have impact on the WCM of 
acquired companies, i.e. Screening hypothesis and Value-added hypothesis are both 
tested here. 
However, before move to the main objective of this dissertation, we are going first to 
check if WCM (and which component(s)) have impact on operational performance of the 
firm. For this purpose, we follow Deloof (2003) linear model, applying OLS regressions. 
 
(1.1) 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖 represents the operational performance measures: Gross margin/TA, 
EBITDA/TA or EBIT/TA ratio; CCC is the Cash Conversion Cycle given by Days sales 
outstanding (“DSO”) plus Days Inventories outstanding (“DIO”) less Days Payables 
outstanding (“DPO”) converted to years; Control variables includes Leverage, measured 
by the Total Debt to Total Assets ratio (“LEV”), Fixed assets growth, measured by the 
relative variation on Fixed assets relative to previous period (“G”), and Size, given by 
logarithm of sales (“SIZE”). Additionally, dummy variables (Dyears), which represent 
each year of our sample are also included. 
The signal of 𝛽2 will indicate how the cash conversion cycle affects the WCM, a positive 
sign would suggest that an increase of CCC will improve the operating performance of 
the company and so the best strategy for the company to manage WC would be increase 
the CC, a negative signal would suggest the opposite. 
According to the past literature, we expect a negative sign, i.e. the lower the CCC, the 
higher will be operational performance: 
 
H1: CCC have a negative impact on the operational performance, i.e. as CCC increases 
operational performance gets worse. 
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Additionally, we check how each individual WC component impacts the operational 
performance, i.e. DSO, DIO and DPO: 
 
(1.2) 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑖+𝛽3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
Moreover, the inclusion of a PE-dummy that equals 1 when firm is PE-backed firm and 
0 otherwise, allows to isolate the possible effect of PE ownership in the operational 
performance. This regression allows us to check if Operational Performance has also 
sensitivity to WCM in case of PE firms. 
 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖) +
𝛽5𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖  
 
We regress the same to the equation 1.2, i.e. instead of CCC and CCC*PE we use DSO, 
DIO, DPO and these variables multiplied by dummy PE. 
 
3.2.1. PE-backed vs non PE-backed firms 
In order to check the potential competitive advantage of PE-backed firms in operational 
performance and WCM, we restricted our data only for the period where PE-backed firms 
are owned by PE firms.  
First, we started by regress equation (2.1) and then we regress the same equation with 
each component of CCC (DSO, DIO and DPO) as dependent variable, controlling in this 
case by the others components: 
 
(2.1) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
Where Dsector is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 when the company is an 
industrial company and 0 otherwise, used to control for possible industry effects. 
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H2: PE-backed firms have a lower CCC, that would suggest PE-backed firms have a 
better WCM. 
 
We should however be aware that if in the second regression the coefficient associated to 
PE is negative and significant this does not indicate that PE firms improve WCM of 
acquired companies, this only attest the potential competitive advantage of this type of 
companies. However, this better results in terms of WCM could be resulted from a 
selection process based on WCM – “ex ante screening role hypothesis” (Gompers and 
Lerner 2001, Baum and Silverman 2004), Therefore in any case, if a competitive 
advantage is attested or not, the potential PE impact will be studied in next subsection. 
 
3.2.2. PE impact 
As discussed before, a better performance may result of “ex-ante screening role 
hypothesis” (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Baum and Silverman, 2004) or “value-added 
hypothesis” (Hellman and Puri, 2002; Ferreti and Meles, 2011).  
As the previous analysis only compares PE-backed firms’ performance with non PE-
backed firms’ performance, we then use a difference-in-difference method as Acharya et 
al. (2010) to verify if PE acquisition has any impact in the PE-backed firms’ performance 
in Working Capital terms. 
For that purpose, we include a new dummy AF, that takes the value of 1 if the observation 
is from a year after the acquisition year and 0 otherwise: 
 
(2.2)  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1(𝑃𝐸𝑖 𝑋 𝐴𝐹𝑖) + 𝛿2𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝛿3𝐴𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 +
𝜃𝑖𝐷𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
𝛿2 represents the impact of the nature of firms: PE-backed or non PE-backed and PE-
target, 𝛿3 represents the impact of post PE-acquisition years and 𝛿1represents the impact 
of PE ownership after PE acquisition.  
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If we assume that the best WCM is the one that reduces the CCC, δ1+δ3 should be negative 
to suggest that the PE adds value through a better WCM.  
 
H3: PE-acquisition improves WCM, i.e., reduces the company CCC. 
 
Table 3 summarizes how the difference-in-difference method works. 
Table 3 – Difference-in-Difference regressors analysis 
 PE-backed Non PE-backed Difference 
Before 𝛿0 + 𝛿2 𝛿0 𝛿2 
After 𝜹𝟎 + 𝜹𝟏 + 𝜹𝟐 + 𝜹𝟑 𝜹𝟎 + 𝜹𝟑 𝜹𝟏 + 𝜹𝟐 
Difference 𝛿1 + 𝛿3 𝛿3  
 
 
3.2.3. Robustness checks 
To consolidate our study, we used three different measures of operational performance 
(Gross Margin/TA, EBITDA/TA and EBIT/TA) to minimize potential accounting 
distortions following Deloof (2003). In addition, we used dummies for all years to control 
for time effects. Endogeneity problems were also minimized by using the group control 
of non PE-backed firms. The use of this group control also minimize potential sector 
effects.  
Furthermore, we looked Durbin-watson statistic if lower than 1 and higher than 3, HAC 
EVIEWS’s estimator was used to control potential Autocorrelation and 
Heteroscedasticity. 
Obviously, panel data regressions could have improved the consistency of our results, 
however Portuguese PE data is not enough to obtain significant conclusions with those 
methods.
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4. Results and Discussion 
How should firms manage their WC? (subsection 4.1.) Do PE-backed firms manage WC 
better? (subsection 4.2.) A screening-selection or a value-added process?  (subsection 
4.3.) The answers to these questions are now presented, additionally we thought relevant 
obtain evidence of PE acquisition direct impact on operating performance. (subsection 
4.4.)  
 
4.1. What is the best WCM, in operating terms? 
To understand how the CCC affects the operational performance we regress equation 
(1.1.). If 𝛽1 is negative, it means there is a negative linear relationship, which suggest that 
the best WCM practice is to reduce the CCC. If 𝛽1 is positive the conclusion will be 
opposite.  
As can be seen in Table 4 (see below) 𝛽1is consistently negative and statistically 
significant except when the operational performance is measured by the EBIT/TA ratio. 
When the CCC decreases 30 days (1 month), Gross margin/TA ratio increases by a 
minimum of 4.49 pp (=53.85/12 months) to a maximum of 5.68 pp (=68.14/12 months), 
while when operating performance is measured by EBITDA/TA this ratio increases by 
approximately 0.50pp. If CCC impact on EBIT/TA was significant, a month increment 
on CCC would mean a reduction of 0.15 pp on EBIT/TA ratio. 
The relevant results for this study is the negative relationship between the CCC and the 
operating performance, suggesting that the best way to improve the WCM is reducing the 
CCC. 
Moreover, we can verify that the impact of WCM on Gross Margin/TA ratio is the 
highest, a minimum impact of more 1.48 pp. in Gross Margin/TA per 10 days unless on 
CCC against a maximum impact of more 0.18 pp. in   EBITDA/TA per 10 days unless on 
CCC. 
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Table 4 – This table reports the estimation of Equation (1.1) for our sample composed by 29 PE-backed companies and 29 non PE-backed companies, using three different proxies of 
operating performance, expressed in percentual points (pp.). The operating performance measures are regressed agains the CCC, express in years. We include control variables and year-
dummies. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied HAC estimator when this statistic has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Variables are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentile. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
  Gross margin/TA EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
  (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
CCC -53.85 *** -68.13 *** -68.14 *** -5.55 ** -6.51 ** -5.64 ** -2.17 -1.94 -1.42 
 
(13.46) (20.09) (20.20) (2.44) (2.87) (2.91) (2.21) (2.40) (2.43) 
Controls Not included included included not included included included not included included included 
 
         
D years not included not included included not included not included included not included not included included 
          
Obs 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
R² 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.22 
Adj. R² 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.17 0.19 
F-stats 20.83 *** 10.90 ***  4.36 *** 8.54 *** 8.53 *** 5.35 *** 1.66 15.91 *** 7.14*** 
HAC used used used used used used used used used 
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Looking for the impact of each CCC component on the operational performance (see table 
5), we obtain evidence that a lower DSO and a lower DIO have a positive effect on the 
operational performance, while the impact of the DPO is not clear being only when the 
operating performance is measured by EBITDA/TA, where the coefficient is (negative) 
statistically significant. Indeed, DIO has higher impact than DSO as less one day in DIO 
results in an increase of approximately 0.50pp (=187.7/365) in Gross margin/TA ratio 
before controlling by control variables and time effects, while the same operational 
improvement is only obtained when DSO decreases 10 days. 
Although DPO’s impact is not significant on operational performance when measured by 
Gross Margin/TA and EBIT/TA ratio, its 10-day positive variation may decrease (with 
significance) EBITDA/TA ratio by 0.25 pp, approximately.  
Consistent with the results to CCC’s impact on operational performance, we also don’t 
find significant evidence of the impact of each component of CCC on operational 
performance when measured by EBIT/TA, in this last measure only DPO has significant 
impact (at 10% of significance) when control variables and Years-dummies are not 
included. 
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Table 5 – This table reports the estimation of Equation (1.2) for our sample composed by 29 PE-backed companies and 29 non PE-backed companies, using three different proxies of 
operating performance, expressed in pp. The operating performance measures are regressed against the DSO, DPO and DIO , express in years. We include control variables and year-
dummies. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied HAC estimator when this statistic has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Variables are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentile. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 Gross Margin/TA EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
DSO -17.91 ** -21.79 ** -21.84 ** -1.47 -2.22 * -1.90 -0.38 -0.77 0.56 
 
(8.20) (10.49) (10.58) (1.55) (1.29) (1.30) (1.53) (1.20) (1.18) 
DIO -187.17 *** -179.69 *** -184.23 *** -14.63 * -12.54 * -12.67 * -6.41 -7.60 -7.50 
 
(47.95) (43.48) (44.42) (7.99) (7.34) (7.10) (7,29) (6.78) (6.53) 
DPO -10.99 -17.39 -14.93 -10.94 ** -10.16 ** -9.83 ** -9.03 * -4.26 -4.42 
 
(37.95) (32.56) (33.35) (5.76) (5.01) (5.11) (5.54) (4.89) (4.82) 
Controls not included included included  not included included  included not included included  included 
 
         
D years not included not included included not included not included included not included not included included 
          
Obs 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
R² 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.06 0.21 0.25 
Adj. R² 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.22 0.05 0.20 0.21 
F-stats 17.53 *** 12.29 *** 6.00 *** 13.77 *** 11.02 *** 7.03 *** 6.42 *** 12.43 *** 6.86 *** 
HAC used used used used used used used used used 
20 
  
The potential impact of PE ownership in the operational performance was also tested 
(regression 1.2.). As we can see in table 6, the WCM of PE own companies has a lower 
impact in the Gross Margin/TA ratio than WCM impact in the Gross Margin/TA ratio of 
non PE-backed firms, (The coefficient of CCC x PE is positive). 
While the results using EBITDA/TA and EBIT/TA as operational performance measures 
don’t show significant differences between the impact of WCM on PE-backed firms and 
the impact of WCM on non PE-backed firms (The coefficient of CCC*PE is not 
significant).   
Table 6 – This table provides the isolated PE effect on independent variables in Operational Performance regression 
(1.1) for our sample composed by 29 PE-backed and 29 non PE-backed firms, checking three different proxies of Return 
on Assets as previously presented. Return on Assets proxies are tested against CCC and CCC*PE. We include control 
variables and years-dummies. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied HAC estimator when this statistic 
has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentile. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
 Gross Margin/TA EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
CCC 
-45.17 
*** 
-121.42 
*** 
-121.24 
*** 
-2.17 -7.53 * 
-7.35 
* 
1.41 1.10 1.11 
 
(13.48) (13.72) (25.35) (3.28) (4.24) (4.43) (2.56) (3.14) (3.34) 
CCC*PE 
-19.41 
107.51 
*** 
107.65 
*** 
-7.55 
*** 
2.32 3.70 
-7.99 
*** 
-5.84 * -4.89 
 (16.75) (18.74) (25.72) (3.21) (4.71) (4.93) (2.85) (3.73) (3.93) 
Controls 
not 
included 
included  included 
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
 
         
Controls
*PE 
not 
included 
included  included  
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
 
         
D years 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
includ
ed 
not 
included 
not 
included 
includ
ed 
 
         
Obs 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
R² 0.074 0.425 0.439 0.060 0.174 0.240 0.050 0.215 0.248 
Adj. R² 0.067 0.409 0.408 0.053 0.150 0.197 0.043 0.192 0.206 
F-stats 
11.19 
*** 
25.45 
***  
13.98 
*** 
8.92 *** 7.23 ***  
5.64 
*** 
7.39 *** 9.42 *** 
5.90 
*** 
HAC Used used used used used used used used used 
 
Table 7 reports also the impact of PE ownership in operational performance through the 
individual management of each component of CCC: DSO, DPO and DIO.  
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Table 7- This table provides the isolated PE effect on independent variables in Operational Performance regression 
(1.1) for our sample composed by 29 PE-backed and 29 non PE backed firms, checking three different proxies of Return 
on Assets as previously presented. Return on Assets proxies are tested against DSO, DPO, DIO, DSO*PE, DIO*PE 
and DPO*PE. We include in an iterative process control variables and years-dummies. We look to Durbin-Watson 
statistic and we applied HAC estimator when this statistic has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, 
and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 
0.05 and 0.95 percentile. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
 Gross Margin/TA EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
DSO 
-28.75  
-37.19 
** 
-37.11 
** 
-1.79 -2.71 -2.71 0.42 0.33 0.27 
 (20.74) (18.50) (18.71) (3.13) (3.07) (3.29) (2.71) (2.59) (2.75) 
DSO*PE 10.22 33.44 * 33.34 * -1.23 0.65 1.34 -2.57 -1.97 -1.43 
 (23.57) (18.51) (18.81) (3.46) (3.24) (3.47) (3.18) (2.80) (2.90) 
DIO 
-246.96 
*** 
-298.07 
*** 
-298.37 
*** 
-16.31 * 
-19.97 
** 
-19.77 
** 
-8.62 -12.37 * 
-12.27 
* 
 
(65.88) (65.39) (65.70) (9.42) (9.51) (9.04) (7.78) (7.89) (7.73) 
DIO*PE 
119.34 
** 
349.86 
*** 
342.54 
*** 
-1.86 16.15 15.46 1.07 7.11 7.07 
 (58.80) (70.66) (70.90) (11.42) (14.44) (13.94) (11.97) (14.40) (14.00) 
DPO 57.65 2.18 3.87 -4.70 -7.27 -6.88 -7.43 -5.91 -5.77 
 (89.35) (72.01) (72.33) (13.08) (12.17) (12.92) (11.01) (10.83) (11.31) 
DPO*PE -112.56  -29.96 -25.34 -10.49 -4.34 3.80 -4.19 1.42 1.31 
 
(90.75) (80.76) (81.54) (14.25) (13.33) (14.07) (12.55) (11.94) (12.32) 
Controls 
not 
included 
included included  
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
 
         
Controls
*PE 
not 
included 
included included 
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
not 
included 
included 
includ
ed 
 
         
D years 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
includ
ed 
not 
included 
not 
included 
includ
ed 
          
Obs 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
R² 0.19 0.50 0.51 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.10 0.24 0.27 
Adj. R² 0.17 0.48 0.48 0.15 0.23 0.26 0.08 0.21 0.22 
F-stats 
10.51 
*** 
22.70 
*** 
14.50 
*** 9.45 ***  
6.36 
*** 5.11 *** 7.09 *** 
5.18 
*** 
HAC used used used used used used used used used 
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Identical to the results regarding differences in CCC impact on operational performance 
between PE-backed and non PE-backed firms, table 7 suggests that also DSO and DIO 
reductions in PE-backed firms have a lower impact on operational performance, when 
measured by Gross Margin/TA ratio (for other measures there isn’t significant evidence). 
In addition, we test the impact direct of PE dummy on operational performance without 
using other explainable variables (see table 8). 
Table 8 -  This table reports the estimation of an extra equation for our sample composed by 29 PE-backed companies 
and 29 non PE-backed companies, using three different proxies of operating performance. The operating performance 
measures are regressed  against the dummy PE. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied HAC estimator 
when this statistic has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Variables are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentile. Standard 
deviations are in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This allows us to check that PE-backed firms under-perform non PE-backed firms in 
operating terms, during the period where PE-backed firms were owned by PE firms: less 
29.43 pp. in Gross Margin/TA, less 4.42 pp. and less 3.28 pp. in EBIT/TA, possibly it 
may indicate that PE-backed firms should make extra efforts to improve their operational 
performance through, for instance, their WCM. 
 
4.2. Do PE-backed firms manage WC better? 
In previous section, we find evidence that a lower CCC improves the operational 
performance of the companies, as it can be seen as the best WCM practice. Given so, we 
now regress equation 2.1 using the components of the CCC (DIO, DSO and DPO) as 
endogenous variables, in order to understand how PE-backed firms manage their WCM 
in comparison with non PE-backed firms. 
 Gross Margin/TA EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
 (A) (B) (C) 
PE -29.43 ** -4.42 ** -3.28 ** 
 (12.78) (1.90) (1.54) 
    
Obs 284 284 284 
R² 0.06 0.06 0.04 
Adj. R² 0.06 0.05 0.04 
F-stats 19.00 *** 17.06 *** 6.00 *** 
HAC used used used 
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As shown in Table 9, none of the coefficients associated to the PE variable is statistically 
significant. Although we cannot conclude that companies owned by PE firms manage 
better the WC, the WCM may be improved by PE-entry (analysed in next section).  
Table 9 – This table provides results of equation 2 for our sample composed by 29 PE-backed and 29 non PE-backed 
firms. CCC is tested against PE-ownership dummy. We include in an iterative process control variables, years-dummies 
and sector dummy. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied HAC estimator when this statistic has a value 
lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentile. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
  CCC 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
PE -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Controls not included included included included 
 
    
D years not included not included included included 
     
Industry effects not included not included not included included *** 
     
Obs 284 284 284 284 
R² 0.007 0.100 0.116 0.170 
Adj. R² 0.004 0.087 0.080 0.133 
F-stats 2.09 7.74 *** 3.24*** 4.62 *** 
HAC used used used used 
 
Despite of inexistence of significant evidence, the positive signal of regressor associated 
with dummy PE indicates a competitive disadvantage of PE-backed firms in WCM. 
In addition, we study PE-ownership impact on DSO, DIO and DPO (see table 10). We 
only found PE-ownership impact on DIO, PE-backed firms have a lower level of DIO, 
less almost 15 days (0.04*365).  
If there were statistical significance of PE-ownership impact on DPO and DSO, it would 
be consistent with a better management of these fields by PE-backed firms. PE-ownership 
regressor is positive for DPO and negative for DIO and DSO. 
As controls, we also check impact of each component in others and we found strong 
evidence of DSO impact on DPO and vice versa. DIO loss impact on DSO and DPO when 
industry effects are controlled. In fact, industry effects only have significant impact on 
DIO. DSO increases as well DPO increases and DIO decreases. DPO increases with both 
DSO and DIO
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Table 10 - This table provides the estimation of three different versions of Equation (3) substituting CCC by DSO, DIO and DPO, for our sample composed by 29 PE-backed and 29 non 
PE-backed firms. DSO, DIO and DPO (expressed in years) are tested against PE dummy and to others CCC components only excluding itself. We include control variables, years-dummies 
and a sector dummy. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied HAC estimator when this statistic has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentile. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
  DSO    DPO    DIO 
  (A) (B) (C) (D)    (A) (B) (C) (D)    (A) (B) (C) (D) 
PE -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  PE 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01  PE -0.03 -0.04 * -0.04 * -0.04 ** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
DPO 2.68 *** 2.47 *** 2.46 *** 
2.45 
*** 
 DSO 0.20 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 
0.16 
*** 
 DSO 
-0.05 
*** 
-0.03 
*** 
-0.03 
*** 
-0.02  
 (0.49) (0.46) (0.47) (0.48) 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
DIO -1.07 *** -0.79 ** -0.80 ** -0.86  DIO 0.31 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.29 *   DPO 0.19 *** 0.22 *** 0.22 ***  0.11 * 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.42) (0.86) 
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)   (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Controls 
not 
included 
included included included 
 Controls 
not 
included 
included included included 
 Controls 
not 
included 
included included included 
 
    
  
    
  
    
D years 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included included 
 D years 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included included 
 D years 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included included 
 
    
  
    
  
    
Industry 
effects 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included 
 
Industry 
effects 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included 
 
Industry 
effects 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
included 
*** 
                 
Obs 284 284 284 284  Obs 284 284 284 284  Obs 284 284 284 284 
R² 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.55  R² 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.59  R² 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.50 
Adj. R² 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.53  Adj. R² 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.57  Adj. R² 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.47 
F-stats 
106.29 
*** 
55.73 
*** 
25.61 
*** 
23.71 
***  F-stats 
107.08 
*** 
62.70 
*** 
29.95 
*** 
27.97 
***  F-stats 7.96 *** 8.67 *** 4.06 *** 
19.25 
*** 
HAC used used used used  HAC used used used used  HAC used used used used 
.   
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Bearing in mind that there isn’t (significant) evidence of a better (or worst) WCM by PE-
backed firms compared with non PE-backed firms, we present the results regarding PE 
acquisition impact on this field in next subsection 
 
4.3. Do PE-entries improve WCM? 
More relevant to the future of PE-industry than looking to a potential competitive 
(dis)advantage on the WCM of firms owned by PE-funds, it is looking to the impact of 
PE-entry on the WCM of acquired companies.   
We regress equation 2.11 to check a potential impact of PE-entry on WCM (see table 11 
and 12), despite of our PE-entry coefficients being negative indicating a reduction from 
4 (=-0.01 year*365 days) to 18 days on CCC after PE-entry, that CCC reduction is not 
statistically significant.   
Table 11 – This table refers to regression 2.2. where we try to check PE-entry impact on WCM, computing CCC against 
dummies PE, AF and the interaction between both: PE*AF. We also add some control variables, industry effects and 
time effects. Our sample is composed by 29 PE-backed and 29 non-PE backed firms and take in account a period 
composed by the 3 years after the acquisition and the 3 years before. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied 
HAC estimator when this statistic has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 
percentile. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 CCC (years) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
PE * AF -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 * -0.10 * -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
PE  0.05 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
AF   0.06 0.06 * 0.04 -0.05 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Industry effects not included not included not included included * included * included        
Controls not included not included not included not included included included        
D years not included not included not included not included not included included        
Obs 295 295 295 295 279 279 
R² 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.11 
Adj. R² 0.00 0 0 0.03 0.01 0.06 
F-stats 0.10 1.12 1.43 3.16 *** 1.58 2.05 *** 
HAC used used used used used used 
 
Indeed, there is solo a result with significance: a worst WCM (more 22 days of CCC) on 
non PE-backed firms in the period after the acquisition of PE-backed firms, although with 
no relevance for our study. 
                                                          
1 We firstly confirm if the negative relationship between CCC and operational performance measures keeps 
valid in the period here analysed. (see appendix II) 
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Table 12 - Difference in Difference extensive analysis of PE-entry impact on WCM. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively to a Wald-test where restrictions are given by DiD 
method. Our sample is composed by 29 PE-backed firms and 29 non PE-backed firms regarding the period composed 
by three years after and three years before acquisition. CCC is measured in years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, looking to each component of CCC our results indicate a negative impact of PE-
entry on DIO and DSO and a null impact on DPO (see table 13), notwithstanding our 
results don’t show a significance below 10%. The only evidence with significance at 10% 
is the negative impact of PE-entry on DSO when analysed in the period composed by 
three years before and three years after PE-entry and controlling by control variables, 
time effects and industry effects. In this case, PE-entry decreases DSO in approximately 
35 days. Simultaneously, there is evidence of a higher level of DSO in PE-backed firms 
in comparison with non PE-backed firms before acquisition, at least 25 days higher. 
Regarding DIO as we said there is not significant evidence, but our results appoint to a 
lower level of DIO in PE-backed firms in comparison with non PE-backed firms before 
acquisition at least 3 days lower.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CCC (A)    CCC (D)   
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) -  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.08 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -0.01  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -0.02 
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) -  DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 0.06 * 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.01  DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.04 
CCC (B)    CCC (E)   
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.05  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.05 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) 0.01  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) 0.00 
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) -  DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 0.04 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.05  DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.01 
CCC (C)    CCC (F)   
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.08  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.05 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -0.02  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) 0.00 
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 0.06  DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 0.05 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.05  DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.01 
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Table 13 – These tables report the result for regression 2.2. substituting CCC for each individual component (in this 
case DSO) to check PE-entry impact on this component. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level (two-sided). Our sample is composed by 29 PE-backed firms and 29 non PE-backed firms regarding the 
period composed by three years after and three years before acquisition. DSO, DIO and DPO are measured in years. 
Standard deviations are in brackets.  
 DSO 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
DPO 0.93 *** 0.92 *** 0.92 *** 0.92 *** 0.89 *** 0.82 *** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
DIO -0.29 * -0.27 * -0.27 * -0.22 -0.19 -0.23 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) 
PE * AF 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 * -0.09 * -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
PE  0.08 * 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
AF   0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 
  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Industry effects not included not included not included included  included  included 
       
Controls not included not included not included not included included  included  
 
      
D years not included not included not included not included not included included 
 
      
Obs 197 197 197 197 188 188 
R² 0.36 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.29 0.36 
Adj. R² 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.30 
F-stats 36.57 *** 20.53 *** 16.54 *** 13.79 *** 8.15 *** 5.96 *** 
HAC used used used used used used 
 
 DIO 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
DSO -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
DPO 0.35 *** 0.35 *** 0.35 *** 0.21 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
PE * AF -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
PE  -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AF   0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry effects not included not included not included included *** included *** included *** 
       
Controls not included not included not included not included included included 
 
      
D years not included not included not included not included not included included 
 
      
Obs 295 295 295 295 279 279 
R² 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.41 0.43 0.44 
Adj. R² 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.40 0.41 0.40 
F-stats 16.21 12.37 *** 9.90 *** 33.61 *** 22.81 *** 11.41 *** 
HAC used used used used used used 
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 DPO 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
DSO 0.26 *** 0.27 *** 0.27 *** 0.27 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
DIO 0.37 *** 0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.32 *** 0.32 *** 0.32 *** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
PE * AF 0.01 0.02 0.04 * 0.04 * 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
PE  -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
AF   0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry effects not included not included not included included included  included  
       
Controls not included not included not included not included included included 
 
      
D years not included not included not included not included not included included 
 
      
Obs 295 295 295 295 279 279 
R² 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.41 0.42 
Adj. R² 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.38 
F-stats 45.80 *** 34.91*** 28.24 *** 23.69 *** 20.55 *** 10.35 *** 
HAC used used used used used used2 
 
As it is possible conclude: there isn’t evidence of value creation on WCM! 
 
4.4. Do PE backed firms need focus on WCM? 
 Thus in addition, we regress operational performance measures against dummies: PE, 
PE*AF and AF, in order to check the direct impact of PE acquisition in operational 
performance (see Table 14).  
To infer if PE acquisition creates value or if it is based in an ex-ante screening process, 
we apply Difference-in-difference method.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 It is important to denote that these results refer to a period composed by 3 years after and 3 years before 
the acquisition, the results could be different if we use a different period composition. In order to robust 
our analysis we regressed the same equation 2.1. to a period composed by 2 years after and 2 years before 
and we found similar results. (see appendix III and IV) 
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Table 14 - This table provides the PE-entry impact in Operational Performance for our sample composed by 29 PE-
backed and 29 non PE-backed firms, in the period composed by 3 years before and 3 years after the PE-entry. 
Operating performance (expressed in pp.) proxies are tested against CCC, PE*AF, PE and AF. We include in an 
iterative process control variables and years-dummies. We look to Durbin-Watson statistic and we applied HAC 
estimator when this statistic has a value lower than 1 and higher than 3. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentile. 
Standard deviations are in brackets.. 
 
 Gross Margin/TA EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
 (A) (B) (D) 
PE*AF 23.69 ** -8.30 *** -7.10 *** 
 (11.60) (3.06) (2.43) 
PE -44.15 *** 3.75 3.46 
 (10.58) (2.80) (2.42) 
AF 3.33 7.63 *** 5.86 *** 
 (14.35) (2.60) (2.11) 
Dyears included included included 
    
Obs 296 296 296 
R² 0.14 0.29 0.27 
Adj. R² 0.11 0.26 0.24 
F-stats 4.19 *** 10.24 *** 9.90 *** 
HAC used used used 
 
Table 15 provides the results regarding DiD applied to operational performance. These 
results indicate that PE acquisition create value when operating performance is measured 
by Gross Margin/TA and there isn’t significant evidence of value creation when measured 
by the two other measures of operating performance. Notwithstanding, the results are 
consistent with value creation through sales and gross margin and not through other 
operating fields. 
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Table 15 - Difference in Difference extensive analysis of PE-entry impact on Operational Performance, using three 
different measures of operational performance (expressed in pp). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively to a Wald-test where restrictions are given by DiD method. Our 
samples is composed by 29 PE-backed firms and 29 non PE-backed firms regarding the period composed by three 
years after and three years before acquisition. 
Operational Performance Gross Margin/TA  Operational Performance EBIT/TA 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) -44.15 ***  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 3.46 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -20.46 *  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -3.63 ** 
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 3.33  
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 5.86 *** 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) 27.02 *** 
 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -1.25 
Operational Performance EBITDA/TA    
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 3.75    
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -4.56 **    
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 7.63 ***    
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.67 
   
 
In fact, the results show that PE firms choose firms with a lower Gross Margin/TA (less 
44.15 pp.) and an improvement in this ratio after the acquisition by almost 27 pp.  
Regarding EBITDA and EBIT to Total Assets ratio the results are not significant, we can 
only conclude that 1) after the acquisition non PE-backed firms outperform PE-backed 
firms by 4.56 pp. and 3.63pp. respectively and 2) non PE-backed firms improved their 
operational performance in the period when similar PE-backed firms are owned by PE 
firms. Results not relevant for our dissertation proposal. If the results were significant we 
could say that PE firms destroy operational value (less 1.25 pp. on EBIT/TA and less -
0.67 pp. on EBITDA/TA).
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5. Conclusions 
 
The most consistent conclusion of our study is that Working Capital Management 
matters. In the two analysis: the one that involves all PE-ownership period and the one 
that involves only three or two years before and three or two years after acquisition, our 
coefficients associated to the Cash Conversion Cycle variable are negative and 
statistically significant suggesting, as predicted by Deloof (2003) and Aktas et al. (2015), 
that the best way to manage WCM is reducing the company CCC. In our case, a decrease 
of 100 days on CCC could result in an increase of more than 9pp in Operational 
performance when measured by Gross Margin/TA.  
We also have analysed the impact of each CCC component individually in the operational 
performance and results are consistent with the aggregate impact in the CCC, i.e., as DSO 
and DIO decrease, Gross Margin and EBITDA to TA ratio increase. Regarding the DPO, 
the impact is only statistically significant on EBITDA/TA, however its coefficient is also 
negative too all measures of operational performance. 
Looking to the impact of the PE-ownership impact in the Working Capital Management, 
our results suggest that is not statistically significant. 
However, if we look individually to each component of the CCC, our results show that 
PE-entry tends to reduce the DSO after the acquisition which suggest that PE firms 
manage better the trade credit of companies they acquire.  
Additionally, our analysis provides evidence of operating underperformance of PE-
backed firms which ranges from approximately -29pp. in Gross Margin/TA to 
approximately -3pp. in EBIT/TA. However, the underperformance in Gross margin/TA 
is already presented previously to the PE acquisition. In case of EBITDA and EBIT to 
TA ratios, there isn’t significant evidence of a potential over or underperformance of PE-
target companies over non PE-target companies before the acquisition. In fact, also there 
isn’t significant evidence of improvements in these ratios after the acquisition.  
Consistently, our results show a positive impact of PE acquisition on the Gross 
Margin/TA ratio, consistent with value creation through increasing sales, an increase of 
27pp., but also show a negative (but not significant) impact on operating performance 
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when measured by EBITDA and EBIT to TA ratio. A maximum loss of 1.25pp. in case 
of EBITDA/TA to 0.67 pp. in case of EBIT/TA. 
Overall, our study shows strong evidence that PE-entry have a not clear impact in the 
operational performance of acquired companies. Although PE-entry have a positive and 
significant impact in the Gross Margin/TA, it also has a negative (but not significant) 
impact in the EBITDA/TA and EBIT/TA. These results are consistent with the ability to 
increase sales margin suggested by Acharya et al. (2010) and with the inexistence of 
evidence of operating gains, suggested by Leslie and Oyer (2008). 
Our dissertation, mainly, did not find evidence of a better management of Working 
Capital by PE-backed firms or improvements after the PE-entry. Indeed, our results report 
a lower impact of WCM on PE-backed firms than on non PE-backed firms. These results 
suggest that Working Capital Management remains an area to be improved by PE firms 
and PE-backed firms should focus in the WCM in order to improve the operating 
performance of the companies they acquire. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix I - General Concepts 
Acronym Concept Explanation 
CCC Cash Conversion Cycle Time needed to convert inputs into 
cash. 
DIO Days Inventories 
Outstanding 
Days needed to convert inventories 
into cash. 
DPO Days Payables 
Outstanging 
Days needed to pay suppliers 
DSO Days Sales Outstanding Days needed to collect cash from 
costumers 
EBIT Earnings before interests  
EBITDA Earnings before interests 
and Depreciations & 
Amortizations 
 
G Fixed assets growth  
LBO Leverage buyout Type of Private Equity investment 
which involves a high amount of 
debt 
LEV Leverage Measured by total debt/total assets 
OP Operational Performance Performance provided by 
operational (not financial) issues 
PE Private Equity Type of investment done by Private 
Investors/funds in private or public 
companies, keeping or converting 
into private. 
PE firm Private Equity firm Firm which make Private Equity 
investments 
ROA Return on Assets Given by Returns/Total assets 
SIZE Size Given by natural logarithm of sales 
TA Total Assets  
WC Working Capital  
WCM Working Capital 
Management 
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Appendix II – CCC impact on operational performance in the period composed by 3 years after and 3 years before PE acquisition 
 
 Gross Margin/TA EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
CCC -35.23 *** -33.09 * -35.98 ** -7.40 -7.77 ** -5.07 -3.94 -4.61 -2.30 
 (18.10) (18.08) (18.26) (5.07) (4.11) (4.32) (4.55) (3.45) (3.43) 
Controls not included included included not included included included not included included included 
          
D years not included not included included not included not included included not included not included included 
          
Obs 290 279 279 284 284 284 284 284 284 
R² 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.36 0.01 0.28 0.39 
Adj. R² 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.33 0.00 0.27 0.36 
F-stats 8.44 *** 3,84 ***  1.70 ** 6.23 *** 23.44 *** 12.41 *** 2.38 27.00 *** 14.17 *** 
HAC used used used used used used used used used 
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Appendix III – PE impact on CCC in the period composed by 2 years after and 2 years 
before PE acquisition 
 
 CCC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PE * 
AF 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
PE  0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
AF  
 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 
 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Industry 
effects not included not included not included included * included * included 
       
Controls not included not included not included not included included included 
 
      
D years not included not included not included not included not included included 
 
      
Obs 197 197 197 197 188 188 
R² 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.11 
Adj. R² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 
F-stats 0.02 0.73 1.43 1.94 * 1.49 1.60 * 
HAC used used used used used used 
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Appendix IV – DiD conclusions of PE impact on CCC in the period composed by 2 years 
after and 2 years before PE acquisition 
 
CCC (1)    CCC (4)   
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) -  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.08 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -0.01  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -0.02 
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) -  DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 0.06 * 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.01  DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.04 
CCC (2)    CCC (5)   
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.05  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.05 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) 0.01  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) 0.00 
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) -  DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 0.04 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.05  DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.01 
CCC (3)    CCC (6)   
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.08  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=0) 0.05 
DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) -0.02  DID - PE vs non PE (AF=1) 0.00 
DID - Before vs After (PE=0) 0.06  DID - Before vs After (PE=0) -0.05 
DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.05  DID - Before vs After (PE=1) -0.01 
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Appendix IV –PE impact on each component of CCC in the period composed by 2 years 
after and 2 years before PE acquisition 
 
 DSO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DPO 0.93 *** 0.92 *** 0.92 *** 0.92 *** 0.89 *** 0.82 *** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
DIO -0.29 * -0.27 * -0.27 * -0.22 -0.19 -0.23 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) 
PE * AF 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 * -0.09 * -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
PE  0.08 * 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
AF   0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Industry effects not included not included not included included  included  Included 
       
SIZE not included not included not included not included included  included  
 
      
D years not included not included not included not included not included Included 
 
      
Obs 197 197 197 197 188 188 
R² 0.36 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.29 0.36 
Adj. R² 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.30 
F-stats 36.57 *** 20.53 *** 16.54 *** 13.79 *** 8.15 *** 5.96 *** 
HAC used used used used used Used 
 
 DIO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DSO -0.09 ** -0.08 ** -0.09 ** -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
DPO 0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.21 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
PE * AF -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
PE  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AF   0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Industry effects not included not included not included included *** included *** included ***        
SIZE not included not included not included not included included Included        
D years not included not included not included not included not included Included        
Obs 197 197 197 197 188 188 
R² 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.42 0.44 0.45 
Adj. R² 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.4 0.42 0.40 
F-stats 10.97 *** 8.33*** 6.66 *** 22.55 *** 15.79 *** 8.91 *** 
HAC used used used used used Used 
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 DPO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DSO 0.30 *** 0.30 *** 0.31 *** 0.31 *** 0.25 *** 0.24 *** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
DIO 0.38 *** 0.37 *** 0.38 *** 0.32 *** 0.31 *** 0.32 *** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
PE * AF 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
PE  -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AF   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry effects not included not included not included included  included  included 
       
Controls not included not included not included not included included included 
 
      
D years not included not included not included not included not included included 
 
      
Obs 197 197 197 197 188 188 
R² 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.46 
Adj. R² 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.41 
F-stats 36.57 *** 27.64 *** 22.02 *** 22.55 *** 15.79 *** 9.14 *** 
HAC used used used used used used 
 
